In this paper a compositional model for reflective agents is proposed within which reasoning about observation, assumption making and communication; an agent's own information state and reasoning processes; other agents' information states and reasoning processes, and combinations of these types of reflective reasoning are explicitly modelled. The types of knowledge needed to detect, analyse and resolve conflicts that arise by meta-reasoning within the agent are discussed. The knowledge and interaction between agents required to model the wise men's puzzle is used to illustrate the approach. The model has been validated using think-aloud protocols. An implementation has been made including a speech synthesis facility.
Introduction
Although not all distributed intelligent systems are designed as multi-agent systems, many are. The metaphor of autonomous agents in interaction with each other and the external world, provides a conceptual basis for the design of distributed systems for which interaction is of primary importance. The intelligent systems themselves can often be described in terms of characteristics associated with the notion of weak agency (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995) . The characteristics of this notion of agency: autonomy, pro-activeness, social ability and reactiveness, provide a means to characterise the behaviour of an intelligent system. Proactiveness and autonomy are related to a system's ability to reason about its own processes, goals and plans, and to control these processes. Reactivity and social ability are related to the ability to be able to communicate and co-operate with other systems and to interact with the external world. In this chapter such distributed intelligent systems are viewed to be multi-agent systems. Each individual system is viewed to be an autonomous agent.
Autonomous agents are often reflective agents: agents capable of reasoning, for example, not only about the behaviour of the external world, but also about their own behaviour, and other agents' behaviour. More specifically, reflective agents are able to reason about:
• their own information states
• their own assumptions
• the control of their own reasoning processes (e.g., which strategy to follow and when)
• their observations (e.g., which observations to perform and when) * A preliminary and shorter version of this work was presented at KAW'96 in Banff.
• their actions (e.g., which actions to perform and when)
• their communication with others (e.g., which communication to perform, with which other agents) • other agents' processes (their information states, assumptions, reasoning processes, observations, communication and actions in the external world)
• interaction between agents (e.g., the extent to which co-operation is successful)
• their own tasks An example of a situation in which an agent needs to be able to perform reflective reasoning is:
Centralised air traffic control has resulted in limited use of the total available space: a limited number of "highways" have been defined within which all aircraft are scheduled. Currently the concept of free flight is being explored: aircraft are free to fly the route they themselves determine with very limited interaction with other aircraft. New traffic rules are being devised to this purpose. One of the main aspects involved is that to be able to determine his/her own course, a pilot needs to be able to reason about the expected behaviour of other aircraft: a pilot needs to be able to reason about a specific situation from the perspective of another pilot given limited information such as the characteristics of the aircraft, its position, its destination. On the basis of this information the pilot can determine his/her own strategy to adapt his/her own course, if and when conflicts occur.
In the literature on reflection such as (Weyhrauch, 1980; Maes and Nardi, 1988; Attardi and Simi, 1994) a restricted number of the types of reflective reasoning distinguished above, are modelled. Non-trivial combinations of different types of reflective reasoning, however, have not been studied extensively. In the literature on modelling in the context of multi-agent systems, most often the types of reflective reasoning agents are capable of performing is limited.
In this paper an agent model is introduced that models non-trivial combinations of reflective reasoning. This model has been used to model distributed air traffic control, as discussed above. A generic agent model is introduced in Section 2 and refined in Section 4 for a reflective agent , illustrated for the specification of the wise men's puzzle (introduced in Section 3). In Section 5 empirical work to validate the model is reported. In Section 6 it is shown how the model was used as a basis for an implemented demonstration system: a reflective agent speaking aloud. The paper finishes with a discussion in Section 7.
Reflective Reasoning in a Generic Agent Model
To design a generic structure for autonomous agents capable of reflective reasoning, the types of reasoning agents can be expected to perform, must be distinguished. In (Brazier, Jonker and Treur, 1997) a compositional generic agent model isintroduced which distinguishes six main processes, modelled by components (see Figure 1) . The types of reflective reasoning performed in each of these components are briefly discussed in this section.
Reasoning about the external world (MWI) is a basic type of reasoning reflective agents are assumed to be capable of performing. A reflective agent needs to be able to reason about a specific situation, extending its own knowledge, by, for example, confirming or rejecting assumptions about the world made in previous reasoning processes. As autonomous agents capable of interacting with the external world, reflective agents must also be capable of reasoning about interaction with the external world (WIM): about, for example, the types of information that can be observed in the external material world, when and how, but also which actions are to be performed, when and how.
An Example Reflective Reasoning Process
To illustrate the different levels involved in an example of reflective reasoning, a simple version of the wise men's puzzle is used. This puzzle requires two wise men (A and B) and two hats. Each wise man is wearing a hat, of which the colour is unknown. Both wise men know that:
• hats can be white or black
• there is at least one white hat
• they can observe the colour of each other's hat
• they both reason fully logically.
Assume, for example, that both men have a white hat and that wise man A is asked whether he knows the colour of his hat. Wise man A must answer that he is incapable of drawing a conclusion about the colour of his own hat. On the basis of this knowledge wise man B can then reason that its own hat is white. This reasoning process is depicted below in The generic agent model briefly presented in Section 2, is refined (specialised and instantiated) to model an agent that is able to perform the reflective reasoning needed to solve this puzzle.
The resulting model can be used to model both wise men: wise man A as Agent A and wise man B as Agent B. For the purpose of explanation, however, the model is described from the perspective of Agent B: the concepts and specifications involved are illustrated from Agent B's point of view. Reflective elements in B's reasoning include reasoning about:
• observations (e.g., the decision to observe the colour of A's hat),
• A's reasoning (which conclusions should A have reached on the basis of specific information), • B's own information state and B's assumptions (e.g., about the colour of B's own hat),
• control of B's reasoning and actions, and
• communication of B with A (which information can and should A provide and when).
Note that for convenience sake quotes to denote an object-meta naming relation have been omitted.
A Compositional Model of a Reflective Agent
In this section the generic agent model is refined. For three of the generic agent components more specific compositions are introduced (see Figure 4) . The most illustrative generic component of an autonomous agent in this example is the component devised to perform the agent's specific task of determining the colour of its own hat. 
Processes at different levels of abstraction
The processes modelled within the agent model for a reflective agent are depicted in Figure 4 . As in the generic agent model the processes involved in controlling an agent (e.g., determining, monitoring and evaluating its own goals, plans) are the task of the component own process control.
Maintaining knowledge of other agents' abilities and knowledge (the task of the component maintain agent information) involves two processes: interpreting available information on other agents (the task of the component interpret agent info), and keeping this information up to date (the task of the component update agent info). Comparably, the processes involved in maintaining information on the external (material) world (the task of the component maintain world information) are two-fold: interpreting available information on the external world (the task of the component interpret world info), and keeping this information up to date (the task of the component update world info).
The reflective agent's specific task in this example domain (the process performed by the component determine hat colour) is to determine the colour of the other agent's hat. This task involves three subtasks for which three components are distinguished: determine method of information acquisition, evaluate process state and determine assumptions.
The component determine method of information acquisition is responsible for the choice of one of three options: (1) observe the colour of agent A's hat hoping this will provide the information required, (2) communicate with agent A on A's conclusions concerning the colour of agent A's own hat and (3) make assumptions on the colour of his own hat and reason about the conclusions A should have drawn.
The component evaluate process state determines the results of having tried one of the methods: whether the method provided the colour of agent B's hat. To be able to reason about the results of the analysis process (the task of the component analyse process state) a separate component cwa analyse process state is needed.
The component determine assumptions determines which assumptions to make during reasoning. To this purpose determine assumptions first generates a possible assumption (the task of determine assumption's component generate assumptions). It then evaluates this assumption by reasoning about the consequences of the assumption (derived by the component interpret agent info in the component maintain agent info): the task of determine assumptions' second component, validate assumptions.
The processes at a lower level of abstraction
In this section the interface knowledge structures for each of the refinements of the top-level processes distinguished above, are presented together with the applicable (meta-)level of the knowledge structures with respect to the encompassing component (note that this is not the level within each of the component's themselves), and task control knowledge.
Refinement of the agent specific task: determine hat colour
The component evaluate process state receives three types of information: 1. information on the agent's own observations (from the component own process control), 2. information on conclusions agent A has reached and communicated (from the component manage agent interaction), and 3. information on the best assumption (if the component determine assumption's component generate assumptions has been able to make a best assumption). On the basis of this information the component analyse process state determines the state of the problem solving process (e.g., whether observations have been made, whether a definite conclusion on the colour of the hat can be drawn). The knowledge with which the state of the process is determined includes both knowledge on which positive conclusions can be based, and knowledge on which negative conclusions can be based. Positive conclusions on the state of the process can be drawn, given that information has been acquired from observation, communication and/or assumption determination. Negative conclusions are based on the lack of positive conclusions; they are drawn by a closed world assumption on the output atoms, explicitly specified at a higher (third) meta-level in the component cwa analyse process state. known_to_me_based_on_obs(hat_colour(A, C:Colour)) (** meta-level 1 **) communicated(A, concludes(A, hat_colour(A, C:Colour))) (** meta-level 2 **) communicated(A, cannot_reach_a_conclusion(A))) (** meta-level 2 **) best_assumption(observed(A, hat_colour(I,C:Colour))) (** meta-level 2 **)
output atoms: The component determine assumptions receives explicit information on the agent's lack of knowledge of A's observations (the truth value false for the input atom known to me(observed(A, hat colour(I, C:Colour)) from the input interface of the component agent specific task: determine hat colour (which it, in turn, has received from the component own process control Task control of determine hat colour Activation of determine hat colour, in combination with activation of the links which can provide the information required by determine hat colour, is specified by agent B's task control. Task control of determine hat colour determines which internal components and links to activate. Activation of evaluate process state is done in combination with activation of the incoming links. If the final evaluation criterion depicting success of determination of colour of the hat, is reached then the task of determine hat colour is fulfilled. If, however, the evaluation criterion that specifies that one or more conclusions concerning previous performance have been reached, succeeds, task control specifies that the component determine method of information acquisition is to be activated, together with the related links. Based on the success or failure of the evaluation criteria, task control determines which component and links to activate next. If, for example, the evaluation criterion observations required, is successful, then determine hat colour sends a request to manage world interaction to make observations in the external world. If, for example, the evaluation criterion assumptions required is successful, then another component of determine hat colour, namely determine assumptions, is activated. The component determine assumptions, in turn, activates one of its components, based on its own task control knowledge.
Refinement of the component: maintain agent information
The component maintain agent information has two components: update current agent information, which stores information on other agents, and interpret agent info, which interprets the available agent information. 
Refinement of the component maintain world information
The component maintain world information has two components: update current world information, which stores information on the world, and interpret world info, which interprets the available world information. Comparable to the composition described in the previous section, the first component only stores and updates information and does not reason. To interpret world information the component interpret world info has knowledge with which it can reason about the world. This knowledge is used by B to draw conclusions from information he has obtained from observation of A's hat colour: if B observes a black hat, then his own hat is white. Note that both A and B can observe part of the external world, but that they observe different parts. This difference is expressed in the specifications by the different information links defined between the external world and the agents. The difference is also mirrored in the input information types of the two agents.
Validation by Empirical Work
The task model for the wise men's puzzle, as described in the previous section, has been designed on the basis of introspection and retrospection. It seems plausible, but it is not clear whether it conforms to the reasoning pattern exhibited by other human reasoners. To verify the psychological validity of our task model a subject was asked to solve the wise men's puzzle and to think aloud while doing so. The thinking aloud protocol acquired from this experiment has been coded in terms of our task model and analysed to see to what extent the subject's reasoning pattern matches the model's. Our subject was given the following description:
This puzzle is about two wise men, A and B, each of which is wearing a hat. Each hat is either black or white but at least one of the hats is white. Each wise man can only observe the colour of the other wise man's hat. Both wise men are able to reason logically and they know this from each other.
The subject was asked to solve four variants of the puzzle. For each variant he was given the colour of A's hat and whether A knows this colour. Note that one of the combinations of A's hat and A's knowledge on his own hat is actually impossible in the given context. It is left as a puzzle for the reader to find out which of the variants is impossible.
For each variant of the puzzle the subject was asked to reason as if he was B and to reason the colour of B's hat given the colour of A's hat and A's knowledge about his own hat. The subject was given instructions to think aloud and the protocol was recorded on a tape recorder. Below a number of fragments of the obtained protocols are presented. observed(A, hat_colour(B, black) A, hat_colour(B, black)) ) output B's hypothetical conclusions on A's reasoning 3-5 ( derivable (A, hat_colour(A, white) observed(A, hat_colour(B, black) ) ) output contradiction of B's assumption 2, 6 ( contradictory (observed(A, hat_colour(B, black) ) ) subtask: assumption generation 2, 6-7, 13 input contradiction of B's assumption 2, 6 ( contradictory (observed(A, hat_colour(B, black)) ) output B's best assumption on A's observations 7, 13 ( best_assumption (observed(A, hat_colour(B, white) ) ) subtask: interpret agent info 7-11 input B's assumption on A's observations 7 ( observed (A, hat_colour(B, white) A, concludes(A, hat_colour(A, white) )))) B's assumption on A's observations 7 ( possible_assumption(observed(A, hat_colour(B, white) observed(A, hat_colour(B, white) concludes(A, hat_colour(A, white) )), communicated information on A's reasoning 2 ( communicated (A, concludes(A, hat_colour(A, white) )) ) B's assumption on A's observations 4 ( possible_assumption (observed(A, hat_colour(B, white) ) ) output contradiction of B's assumption 4, 7 ( contradictory (observed(A, hat_colour(B, white) observed(A, hat_colour(B, white)) ) output B's best assumption on A's observations 8 ( best_assumption (observed(A, hat_colour(B, black) )) ) subtask: interpret agent info 8, 9 input B's assumption on A's observations 8 ( observed (A, hat_colour(B, black) concludes(A, hat_colour(A, white) ))) communicated information on A's reasoning 2 ( communicated(A, concludes(A, hat_colour(A, white) )) ) B's assumption on A's observations 8 ( possible_assumption (observed(A,hat_colour(B,black) concludes(A, hat_colour(A, white) A, hat_colour(A, black) )) ) B's assumption on A's observations 9 ( possible_assumption(observed(A, hat_colour(B, white) )) ) output contradiction of B's assumption 10-11 ( contradictory ( observed(A , hat_colour(B, white)) ) )
The analysis of the protocol shows that the subject's decomposition of the complex reasoning task into subtasks matches the decomposition that underlies the model designed on the basis of our own reasoning experiences. However, it also appeared that the order in which our subject tackled the subtasks differs somewhat from the order specified by our model. In other words, the control structure of our model does not completely match the reasoning pattern of our subject.
The main difference is that the subject is more careful in drawing a final conclusion than the model. When, in the model, an assumption for the colour of B's hat leads to a contradiction, it is concluded that B wears a hat of the inverse colour. Our subject appeared to be more cautious. After deriving a contradiction from an assumption for B's hat he did not always conclude blindly that the colour of B's hat must be the inverse of his assumption, but he checked first whether this inverse colour would not lead to a contradiction. This behaviour is of course justified by the possibility of an impossible situation.
A consequence of this careful reasoning is that the subject did not base his initial assumption on knowledge about A, as specified in the model, but made a rather arbitrary initial assumption, knowing that he would have to check the other possibility anyhow. Therefore in (the impossible) situation 4 the subject gave a solution whereas our model would have failed to do so.
All in all our model has shown to be largely psychologically plausible. The difference between subject and model can be explained by the fact that the model was not designed to reason about situations that cannot occur.
Implementation: a Reflective Agent Reasoning Aloud
The reflective agent model has been implemented in a demonstration system for reflective reasoning, in which the reasoning patterns performed are spoken aloud using dynamic speech synthesis. This demonstration system will be discussed on the basis of an example reasoning pattern for the case of two white hats. The most important parts of the reasoning pattern are shown in the table below. The text fragments are selected and composed dynamically, depending on which rules succeed, and on randomness if more than one text fragment can be chosen in a given situation. No text fragment is chosen for rules that do not succeed. The resulting verbalising agent has been quite successfully applied in educational sessions to illustrate the principles behind reflective reasoning.
Discussion
This paper has addressed meta-reasoning and reflection in compositional agent modelling, in particular with respect to agent abilities and architecture. An example of a reflective agent, based on a generic agent model, has been presented within which reasoning about (1) observation and agent interaction (2) an agent's own information state and reasoning processes (3) other agents' information states and reasoning processes, and combinations of these types of reflective reasoning, are explicitly modelled. To illustrate the transparency of the structure, partial specifications of the wise men's puzzle have been presented within which components at different meta-levels of knowledge and reasoning) are distinguished. The agent is able to deliberately introduce a conflict, by making an assumption that is expected to turn out to be false. The reasoning process aims at falsification of the assumption. Conflict detection occurs when the the deductive consequences of the assumption are compared to observation results. After detection of the conflict the conflict is resolved by assigning a higher priority to observation results than to assumptions.
In the model presented in this chapter the dynamics of the combined pattern of reasoning, observation and communication is modelled: the specification explicitly expresses the strategy with which the problem is approached. Specification of the problem, abstracting from the dynamics, would also have been possible. However, in that case, either strategic knowledge to guide the problem solving has to be added at the implementation level, or a theorem prover or other program would need to search for the solution in the space of all possible alternatives. In the former case an implementation independent description of the dynamics of the system would be lacking. In the latter case the search process may be inefficient. Moreover, the system behaviour differs significantly from the way in which human agents most often approach problems such as this: human agents use strategic knowledge to guide the search.
The analysis of a human subject's think aloud protocol showed that the reflective behaviour modelled and implemented, corresponds for all situations for which the model had been devised: namely the only possible situations. The human subject, however, also reasoned about situations that could not possibly occur. The different levels of reasoning, however, did occur in both the model and in the subject's protocol.
These semantically distinct meta-levels were explicitly modelled. An advantage of this approach is that the model has a rich structure with different constructs for entities that are semantically different. As a result a more complex problem may require additional meta-levels. This may be considered to be the price that has to be paid for the richer structure. An alternative approach is that all meta-levels are encoded in the highest meta-level. The price that is paid in this case is that the finer semantical distinctions between the different meta-levels found in practice are not explicitly represented.
The model has been implemented in a demonstration system for reflective reasoning, in which the reasoning patterns performed are spoken aloud on the basis of dynamic speech synthesis.
